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Abstract 
This article examines the cultural and political meanings of detention centers for 
undocumented migrants in Greece. Through the consideration of the Dublin Regulation, 
which holds that asylum seekers’ applications can be evaluated and adjudicated only in 
the country where they first enter, and the presence of Frontex at Greece’s borders for an 
integrated border management, the article situates Greece’s immigration detention 
centers within the wider context of state sovereignty and policies of admission and 
detention. Following the theoretical elaborations of Carl Schmitt (2013) and Wendy Brown 
(2010) on territorial division, the state of exception and waning sovereignty, in conjunction 
with reports from the Human Rights Watch and the Greek Council for Refugees, the 
article argues that immigration detention centers have three meanings for EU citizens 
and migrants. First, the building of detention centers for unregulated immigrants is an 
explicit attempt to assert the EU member-state as a ‘total state’ where it can discern 
between friend and enemy and rule by limiting or eliminating diverse forces that might 
develop in its interior. This rule does not, however, depend on the implementation of the 
law but on its suspension and consequently this suspension acquires a permanent 
status. Second, detention centers communicate anxieties regarding order in the interior 
of the state and fear and danger in the exterior. Detention centers demarcate where 
European notions of civilization end but they also highlight the point where the civilized 
subject can be legitimately violent and uncivilized. Third, detention centers not only 
prevent unregulated immigrants from entering the EU and the nation state but also 
produce their content. By safeguarding the national and European territories from the 
threats which unregulated immigration is thought to pose, detention centers help to 
produce a defensive national subject in fear of being contaminated by the arrival of 
anonymous, stateless people.  
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Introduction 
Greece is a primary transit point for 
documented and undocumented 
immigrants desperately attempting to 
enter the EU area from Africa, the Middle 
East and Asia. Under political and 
electoral pressure from the EU and from 
Greek citizens respectively, the 
conservative-led coalition government of 
Greece (June 2012-January 2015) 
adopted drastic measures for the 
detention and subsequent repatriation of 
undocumented migrants and asylum 
seekers. Migrants and asylum seekers 
detained in Greece’s disused military 
camps are subjected to deplorable living 
conditions and unprecedented racially-
motivated violence. The purpose of this 
article is to establish some of the 
political and cultural meanings of 
Greece’s detention centers by 
considering the weakening of the nation 
state’s role in the management of 
immigration, and the legal and cultural 
frameworks detention centers 
simultaneously both construct and 
dismantle.  
The present examination proceeds by 
establishing two theoretical and 
empirical distinctions. First, the 
establishment of EU surveillance and 
patrol bodies and organizations runs 
against the apparent pledge for the 
construction of a borderless polity 
directed by a federal state. An 
examination of policy documents as well 
as reports from the Human Rights Watch, 
the European Court of Human Rights 
and the Greek Council for Refugees 
indicates that EU member-states are 
nostalgic for a time where nation states 
were considered politically and culturally 
homogeneous entities and were in a 
position to exercise power that was 
material and visible. Second, the article 
is not exclusively concerned with an 
analysis of the detention centers that 
lies, in a theoretical and empirical sense, 
outside of them. Such an approach 
would analyze only how the meaning of 
immigration detention centers is 
determined by external factors, namely 
the state of the economy and the 
number of unregulated immigrants 
wishing to enter the EU. The article also 
pays attention to ideas regarding 
homogeneity and security and to 
collective sentiments towards 
immigration and immigrants. These ideas 
and sentiments are permeated by a 
conception of Europe as place of civility, 
justice and equality. However, the 
methods used for the protection of this 
conception from unregulated and 
unwelcomed migrants often occur 
outside the established legal frameworks 
and at the same time challenge this 
particular conception of Europe.  
 
The Immigration Crisis as European 
Crisis 
Besides the monetary union and its 
subsequent problems, the EU is 
struggling to come to terms with 
changing patterns of populations, 
immigration flows, cultural and ethnic 
diversity, and the control of mobility at its 
external and internal borders. Even 
though the migrant crisis Europe is 
facing has been overshadowed by the 
current financial crisis, the former has 
managed to intensify its impact on the 
way the ideas of Europe and of the 
European project are perceived and 
experienced by both Europeans and 
non-Europeans. More specifically, the 
immigrant crisis constructs mobility, 
asylum and refuge as objects of fear and 
in turn presents them as constitutive 
elements for the management of the 
European project and the wellbeing of 
Europeans.  
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Since its inception as an economic and 
political entity, the EU has been trying to 
dilute its internal borders through the 
free movement of the citizens of its 
member-states and by protecting its 
external borders with policing, treaties 
and regulations, which prevent entry to 
unauthorized people. As a result of the 
abolition of borders between member-
states, and the freedom of movement of 
their respective citizens, a sharp 
distinction between EU citizens and 
migrants started to develop. Immigration 
to Europe has become practically 
impossible and at the same time the 
rights of non-Europeans residing in 
Europe, categorized as ‘third country 
nationals’, differ significantly from those 
with EU citizenship (Harding 2012).  
The EU has devised two legal and 
operational mechanisms in order 
effectively to manage the inflow of third 
country nationals to its territory. These 
mechanisms focus on the asylum 
application system in the EU and the 
securitization/militarization of the EU’s 
external borders. First, a certain 
mechanism was needed for determining 
responsibility for asylum applications 
submitted to the EU member-states. 
Such a mechanism would ensure access 
to all processes leading to the granting 
of refugee status but at the same time 
would prevent abuse of the asylum 
system through the submission of 
multiple applications to multiple 
member-states. This mechanism 
materialized in the Dublin Convention 
and its later manifestation, the Dublin 
Regulation. The Dublin Regulation was 
certified in 2003 and it is mostly known 
as Dublin II. Dublin II is an EU law that 
establishes the criteria for determining 
which member-states are responsible for 
dealing with specific asylum seekers as 
individual cases seeking international 
protection under the Geneva Convention. 
Dublin II establishes the principle that 
the member-state in question, not the 
EU, is responsible for examining an 
asylum application. Dublin II constitutes 
a response to asylum seekers violating 
immigration laws by travelling illegally 
from country to country, often relying on 
highly paid smugglers to help them. The 
International Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (UNHCR, Paragraph 1, 
Article 31) states that asylum seekers 
may use or have been forced to use 
illicit means of entry into safe countries 
and in turn these countries should not 
penalize them for their mode of entry. 
However, with the creation of the 
European single border, asylum seekers 
and other unregulated immigrants have 
come to be seen as threats to the EU’s 
security. The association of asylum 
seeking with illegality and criminality has 
led to the presumption that most asylum 
cases are fabricated and that extreme 
exclusionary measures can be justified.  
Since the member-state that a person 
first entered is responsible for dealing 
with the asylum application, all member-
states on the borderlands of the EU are 
under immense economic, admin-
istrative and social pressure. Dublin II 
constructs a Europe with varying 
standards of reception facilities and 
social conditions where asylum seekers 
and economic migrants are frequently 
treated as a lesser category of people 
with fewer rights.  
From the Greek-Turkish borders to the 
Spanish Canary Islands and the Italian 
island of Lampedusa, the arrival of tens 
of thousands of refugees from Syria, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Somalia is 
posing serious challenges to the EU’s 
commitment to the protection of human 
rights, and to further integration amongst 
member-states. Western, central and 
northern European countries are 
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hesitant to undertake administrative 
duties and economic obligations for 
migrants who arrive at the southern and 
eastern gates of Europe. As a result, tens 
of thousands of asylum seekers and 
unregulated immigrants are trapped in a 
network of bureaucracy, xenophobia and 
limited economic resources.  
The second mechanism to manage the 
inflow of third country nationals focuses 
on the security of the European border 
and its subsequent militarization. Frontex 
(a contraction of the French Frontières 
Extèrieures) was established in 2004, 
started operating in 2005, and was the 
first EU agency to be based in a new 
member-state, Poland. The EU did not 
conceive Frontex as an active policy-
making agency, but instead as a 
facilitator of cooperation between 
member-states on issues of border 
management and enforcement. The 
main activities of Frontex are coordin-
ation, research and surveillance. Frontex 
does not engage with these assignments 
through the setting of new border control 
infrastructure but rather through the 
cooperation and coordin-ation of various 
agencies such as Europol, the European 
Union Satellite Centre (EUSC), the 
European Defence Agency (EDA), the 
European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), 
the European Space Agency (ESA), and 
the European Centre for Disease Control 
(ECDC). The coordination and 
cooperation of these diverse agencies 
aspire to a complete and comprehensive 
surveillance of EU’s external borders. The 
overall approach is defined by Frontex as 
a ‘network approach’ (Feldman 2012: 83) 
and the guidelines for such an approach 
are found in what the EU has called 
‘integrated border management’ (ibid.). 
The constitution of Frontex attests to the 
need for international and coordinated 
action against undocumented migration 
but also highlights the limitations of 
member-states to deal with migration as 
isolated legal and political entities. As Gil 
Fernandéz, deputy executive director of 
Frontex told the Human Rights Watch in 
December 2010: ‘we are always 
explaining what is somewhat difficult to 
explain. Our role is one of coordinator. 
We act as a facilitator between states for 
resources. The operations are always led 
by the host state’ (quoted in Human 
Rights Watch 2011:11). 
Although the EU insists that Frontex is 
more of a coordinator than an actor in 
the field of immigration, Frontex has 
rapidly morphed into a significant actor 
that plays a key role in determining and 
enforcing EU immigration policy. The 
budget allocated to Frontex is indicative 
of its current transformation. From a 
budget of 6.2 million in 2004 to a 
budget of 88 million in 2010, Frontex 
has managed to employ 272 seconded 
national experts, temporary and 
permanent employees and to coordinate 
joint maritime operations for the control 
of migration involving non-EU countries 
such as Senegal (Frontex, 2010). In 2007 
the Frontex regulation was accompanied 
and reinforced by the RABIT Regulation 
with the mission to create ‘Rapid Border 
Intervention Teams’ in order to stop the 
flows of undocumented migrants to the 
EU. The southern member-states were 
the first to express objections regarding 
the isolation and subsequent lack of 
resources for preventing unregulated 
immigration. Considering these com-
plaints and the perceived threat of 
unregulated immigration, the European 
Parliament voted in favor of the 
constitution of such a team. The 
constitution of RABIT signaled in a clear 
manner the representation of 
undocumented migration as an illegal 
and criminal activity. Members of the 
RABIT Regulation were authorized to 
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bear arms and to use force with the 
consent of member-states (ibid.). 
Greece, as a cooperating EU member-
state, has been the recipient of EU 
personnel and resources through the 
RABIT deployment. The first Frontex 
mission began in October 2010 at the 
request of the Greek government for 
help in preventing unregulated 
immigration at Greece’s north-east 
borders with Turkey. Frontex deployed 
175 RABIT officers from twenty-four EU 
countries along the border between the 
area of Orestiada and Alexandroupolis. 
Further to standard procedures of 
surveillance, RABIT officers interviewed 
undocumented migrants in order to 
identify their country of origin and the 
causes of their mobility towards the EU, 
and to collect information with respect 
to trafficking and smuggling networks. 
Greece’s geographical position and the 
difficulties it faces averting and 
regulating immigration have authorized 
Frontex to establish a permanent office 
in the Greek coastguard headquarters in 
the port of Piraeus, as the principal 
headquarters for all operations in the 
East Mediterranean area.  
From the overview of those two 
mechanisms a series of contradictions 
become apparent with respect to the 
role of the state in this assemblage of 
supranational policies and organizations 
and international cooperation. The EU 
denies any collective responsibility 
concerning the assessment of asylum 
applications and designates the 
member-state responsible for their 
evaluation, but at the same time 
recognizes the limited resources of 
member-states, especially those on the 
borderlands, dealing with the policing 
and surveillance of their borders and by 
association, European borders. Further-
more, these two mechanisms are not 
only a response to an immigration crisis 
in Europe but they also contribute to and 
are constitutive elements of this crisis by 
criminalizing immigration, militarizing the 
border and by leaving member-states 
with limited resources and immense 
financial problems in dealing with 
asylum seekers and their applications.  
Where do these contradictions leave the 
state? EU member-states such as Greece 
can neither delineate the political terrain 
of immigration nor monopolize its 
management by policy and policing. EU 
member-states and Greece in particular 
are limited to performing the political 
role of the construction and preservation 
of national identity through categ-
orization and exclusion. Foucault (2008) 
terms the power to manage and 
categorize the population as ‘govern-
mentality’, which constitutes the main 
way the state vitalizes itself. As Judith 
Butler (2004) points out, it is interesting 
that Foucault refers explicitly to the 
vitalization of the state instead of its 
legitimation. Here Foucault insinuates 
that the state without governmentality 
would gradually deteriorate. Yet the 
state’s dependence on governmentality 
is a modern political phenomenon and 
practice. Traditionally, sovereignty 
provided legitimacy for the rule of law. 
But as sovereignty in that traditional 
context has lost authority, govern-
mentality has emerged as a form of 
power capable of providing meaning to 
the state’s exclusionary and disciplinary 
techniques. Foucault (2008) context-
ualizes the concept of governmentality 
within an historical analysis of the 
emergence of national government and 
administration and the emergence of 
forms of knowledge manifesting itself as 
public policy. Therefore, governmentality, 
broadly understood as a mode of power 
dealing with the control and mobility of 
people, provides useful insights for 
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examining the weakening role of the 
nation state with respect to immigration, 
as well as for the disciplinary and 
exclusionary techniques employed by 
the state in order to reassert its 
existence. 
Governmentality operates through state 
and non-state institutions and 
discourses, which do not necessarily 
seek legitimacy by elected and 
established political authorities. Charac-
terized by a constellation of strategies 
and interventions, governmentality 
acquires a meaning as long as it orders 
and categorizes populations and 
produces and reproduces subjects. EU 
mechanisms for regulating immigration 
and asylum-seeking, and the diminishing 
role of nation states in defining and 
controlling their borders, are embodied 
in the presence and function of 
immigration detention centers. Wendy 
Brown (2012) suggests it is the gradual 
weakening of the nation state that has 
provided a fertile ground for the building 
of detention centers and fences as 
means towards the minimization and 
management of unregulated migration 
as well as towards the distinction 
between eligible and ineligible, legal and 
illegal, legitimate and illegitimate. 
 
The Administrative and Territorial 
Power of the Detention Center 
Immigration detention centers form the 
foreground to a backdrop dominated by 
uncontrolled and undetected immig-
ration flows, humanitarian crises outside 
the EU, insecurity and fear. Due to their 
material presence, detention centers 
attempt to communicate in the most 
visible way the power of the state by 
focusing on the detention and 
administration of stateless individuals. 
The proliferation of detention centers for 
immigrants in Europe stands as a 
constant reminder that every action 
towards a borderless and unified Europe 
is accompanied by fear of outsiders and 
anxieties regarding sovereignty, law and 
order within nationally-defined bound-
aries. 
The consensus amongst politicians, 
citizens and policing authorities on the 
necessity of detention centers in Europe 
does not mean that there are not any 
noticeable differences regarding the type 
of immigrants detained, the use of 
disciplinary technologies, and the ideas 
and beliefs, which inform the building of 
these centers and their management. 
Detention centers in Europe are 
classified according to the purposes they 
serve and the type of non-Europeans 
they detain. There are detention centers 
for those wishing to apply for asylum, 
commonly categorized as asylum 
seekers, and for immigrants initially 
refused entry to their country of choice 
and waiting evaluation of their situation. 
After this evaluation the applicants would 
either be admitted to the territory of the 
member-state or returned to the 
post/border where they initially entered. 
There are also detention centers for non-
Europeans who have committed an 
illegal act in the territory of a member-
state other than ‘illegal migration’ and 
are awaiting deportation. However, most 
detention centers in the EU, and in 
Greece in particular, are used to detain 
asylum seekers, immigrants awaiting 
evaluation of their application, and non-
Europeans involved in illegal activities. 
These detention centers also serve the 
function of identifying and screening 
undocumented migrants.  
In 2012 the governing parties of the 
Right and the Centre Left voted on a bill 
for the construction of detention centers 
in various locations around Greece. 
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Parties of the Left and the Far Right were 
against the building of these centers for 
different ideological and political 
reasons. In particular, the parties of the 
Left raised concerns regarding the 
protection of the detainees’ human 
rights, living conditions and access to 
legal representation, whereas parties of 
the Far Right, such as the neo-Nazi party 
Golden Dawn, were of the view that all 
immigrants should leave the country 
regardless of the conditions of their 
detention. Despite the determination of 
political parties and supranational 
organizations to initiate the building of 
detention centers in Greece, local 
authorities and citizens are in principle 
opposed to them. Although authorities 
and citizens alike perceive immigration 
as a major problem and as a criminal 
activity with multiple social reper-
cussions, the presence of detention 
centers and ultimately of a great number 
of spatially-confined migrants raises 
concerns over public health and order. 
The detention centers of Tychero, Feres, 
Soufli and Fylakio in the area of Evros do 
not prevent migrants from attempting to 
cross the border but instead they 
contribute to an increasing number of 
fatal accidents. For migrants who had 
managed to avoid capture in the 
northern border area of Greece there are 
detention centers in greater Athens and 
in neighboring towns such as the centers 
of Petrou Rali, Korinthos, and 
Amygdaleza. In addition, twenty detention 
centers have been built around Greece 
for the purposes of screening and 
evaluation of asylum applications and of 
deportation. 
According to Article 13 of the 
Presidential Decree (PD114/2010), 
asylum seekers may be detained for 
three months maximum from the date of 
the registration of their asylum 
application. An applicant can be 
detained for one of the following reasons: 
the applicant does not possess or has 
destroyed his/her travel documents and 
it is necessary to determine the identity, 
the circumstances of entry and real 
information of his/her origin, in 
particular in the case of mass illegal 
immigration; the applicant constitutes a 
danger to national security or public 
order; detention is considered necessary 
for the prompt and effective completion 
of the application. Article 13 continues 
by emphasizing that detention of asylum 
seekers and undocumented migrants 
should be limited to the maximum 
duration required and should not exceed 
in any case ninety days. If an applicant 
has already been detained in view of a 
deportation order, the total detention 
duration must not exceed 180 days.  
Almost all undocumented migrants 
captured in the area of Evros, on the 
Northeastern borders of Greece, are 
detained with the objective of 
deportation. The detainees are deported 
to either their country of origin or 
indirectly via Turkey, based on the 
readmission protocol signed by the two 
countries. The most common argument 
regarding the detention of undocum-
ented migrants is the apparent danger of 
absconding. In practice the authorities in 
charge do not treat the detainees as 
individuals and they disregard their 
respective needs and status. The 
duration of the detention can be 
extended to a maximum of six months, 
and in certain circumstances to eighteen 
months, and depends on the possibility 
of deportation and in turn on the 
nationality assessment. In addition to 
these parameters, the overcrowding of 
detention is a contributive factor in the 
duration of detention. Detainees 
assigned to be of certain nationalities 
such as Iraqi, Syrian, Georgian, Turkish 
and Iranian are detained for an extended 
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period until they are sent back to Turkey, 
or until the maximum detention period 
of six months has expired. Another group 
of detainees, those considered to be 
Nigerian or Dominican, among others, 
stay in detention in order to be deported 
via Athens. Either they will be directly 
transferred to the airport or they will 
detained in one of greater Athens’ 
detention centers for an extended period 
of six or eighteen months and then 
deported. The main criterion that 
determines detention is the feasibility of 
deportation. If deportation is not feasible 
then detainees could be released. 
However, the procedure for determining 
the feasibility or non-feasibility of 
deportation as well as the duration of the 
detention is not clearly defined.  
 
The Meaning of Detention Centers in 
Greece 
The detention center represents a 
particular type of rationality - a perfect 
political order where only staff and 
detainees can be flawed, and their 
actions can and should be rectified. The 
focus on the rationality, function and 
legal structure of detention centers can 
allow an analysis of what creates the 
meaning of detention centers but does 
not provide an answer to the question of 
what  detention centers mean for Greek 
citizens and unregulated migrants. The 
exertion to secure the borders of the EU 
and protect EU citizens from unregulated 
migrants, as well as protecting 
unregulated migrants from smugglers, is 
deeply rooted in the rhetoric of just and 
unjust, friend and enemy, socio-political 
order and chaos, health and illness. 
These binary oppositions are not merely 
abstract ideas about the constitution of a 
well-ordered polity, they are also 
sentiments communicated by politicians, 
citizens, migration authorities and 
migrants.  
The rhetoric of EU officials and migration 
authorities such as Frontex is part of a 
cultural structure that remains largely 
imperceptible to all actors involved. 
Jeffrey Alexander (2006) points out that 
cultural structures are not only external 
but also internal – they contain a 
meaning and this meaning needs to be 
made perceptible. The internal dimen-
sion of these structures does not provide 
any space for rational and instrumental 
political action. Instead, it constitutes ‘an 
ideal resource that partially enables and 
partially constrains action, providing for 
both routine and creativity and allowing 
for the reproduction and transformation 
of culture’ (Alexander 2006: 12). 
Intranational organizations, nation states 
and immigration authorities have an 
ideal foundation that fundamentally 
shapes their actions and aims. Every 
action towards the apprehension of 
unregulated immigration, regardless of 
how objective and instrumental it is, or 
how it is shaped and informed by 
relevant data, provides a particular 
meaning. What is needed here is a 
theoretical analysis of the rhetoric and 
symbols that create and sustain the 
meaning of the immigration detention 
centers in Greece.  
The building of detention centers in the 
liberal democratic member-states of the 
EU takes place on the premise of a state 
of emergency – a state both created and 
explained by the unregulated 
immigration flows to Europe. Even 
though this state of emergency is 
supposed to be temporary, the presence 
of detention centers and the 
militarization of the border indicate a 
permanent state of emergency 
exemplified by an immigration crisis that 
goes hand in hand with a crisis of the 
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European and Greek territories. In 
Nomos of the Earth, Carl Schmitt 
(2003:194) states that ‘the territory of the 
state is the theatre of rule’. Yet the state 
has ceased being a protagonist in the 
design and implementation of 
immigration policies and border security, 
and its territory is in dispute. The 
building of detention centers for 
unregulated immigrants is an explicit 
attempt to assert the EU member-state 
as a ‘total state’ (Schmitt 1999) where it 
can discern between friend and enemy 
and rule by limiting or eliminating forces 
(such as the presence of unregulated 
immigrants and stateless people) that 
might develop in its interior. However, 
this rule does not depend on the 
implementation of the law as illustrated 
by immigration policies and directives 
but on its suspension. The detention 
center manifests itself both physically 
and politically when the suspension of 
the law acquires a permanent territorial 
arrangement and consequently remains 
outside the normal state of the law – 
outside of the state of organized 
interests and associations such as the 
ECHR and NGOs. ‘The camp is the space 
that opens up when the state of 
exception starts to become the rule’ 
(Agamben 2000: 39, emphasis in the 
original).  
According to Agamben’s (2005: 24) 
reading of Schmitt, the understanding of 
the state of exception is determined by 
its ‘localization (or illocalization)’. At the 
outset a spatial distinction between what 
is inside and what is outside of the law 
on immigration and detention appears to 
be inadequate for explaining the 
meaning of detention. Is it possible for 
this state of lawlessness inside the 
detention center to be accommodated 
by the legal order? Is it possible for law 
to accommodate its own suspension 
during exceptional moments – moments 
of crisis? On the one hand, Agamben 
(2005: 23) points towards the perception 
of the state of exception, as ‘an integral 
part of positive law because the 
necessity that grounds it is an 
autonomous source of law’. On the other 
hand, the state of exception can be 
perceived as ‘essentially extrajuridical’ 
(ibid); something that precedes the legal 
order of the state or exists outside of it. 
However, both of these understandings 
are insufficient for the understanding 
and positioning of the state of exception. 
The state of exception cannot be found 
inside or outside the state’s legal order, 
but instead within a ‘zone of indifference 
where inside and outside do not exclude 
each other but blur with one another’ 
(ibid). Correspondingly, the suspension of 
the law in the detention center is neither 
external nor internal to existing 
immigration policies but instead 
mentalities and practices inside and 
outside the detention center redefine the 
limits of the legal order in relation to 
unregulated immigrants and their lives.  
 
‘Special Facilities’: The Violence on 
Rights and the Right to Violence 
On the 21st September 2011, the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) declared the asylum situation in 
Greece a ‘humanitarian crisis’. According 
to the UNHCR, Greece’s lack of an 
appropriate social and political 
infrastructure regarding its asylum 
system has ‘important implications for 
the wider EU’. The humanitarian crisis 
described by the UNHCR had been 
developing for a number of years, as 
Greece became the major gateway for 
asylum seekers and undocumented 
migrants into the EU. Greece’s 
geographical location, its porous 
northern, eastern and coastal borders, in 
tandem with its inadequate immigration 
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policies and inadequate asylum system, 
contributed to the unfolding of an 
emergency situation pivoting around 
resources, public sentiments, politics and 
policies.  
In response to this emergency, the 
government redirected its focus on a 
micro-level in order to minimize the flow 
of undocumented migrants into Greece. 
The main measure adopted out of this 
change in scale and policy was the 
extension of the detention period of 
those whose deportation is feasible, and 
of asylum seekers. The result of this new 
measure was overcrowded detention 
centers and the subsequent 
deterioration of the living conditions 
within them, as well as a series of 
violations of human rights with respect 
to legal representation and access to 
bureaucratic procedures.  
The official terms used by the Greek 
authorities to describe these detention 
centers are ‘special areas for hosting 
foreigners’ and ‘special facilities for 
aliens’ (Law 3386/2005, Article 81). The 
umbrella terms of ‘special areas’ and 
‘special facilities’ include two main types 
of detention centers. First, there are the 
police and border-guard stations, which 
were initially set up for short-term 
detention and screening of detained 
undocumented migrants. Second, there 
are detention centers proper, which are 
for detaining foreign nationals awaiting 
deportation. Due to overcrowding, the 
distinction between those two categories 
of detention centers has never been 
experienced by detainees or practiced 
by immigration authorities (Xenakis and 
Cheliotis 2013). A plethora of reports by 
domestic and foreign media (The 
Guardian 2013; To Vima 2013) as well as 
organizations (United Against Racism; 
Human Rights Watch; Greek Council for 
Refugees) have illustrated that the 
detention of immigrants in Greece 
involves prolonged exposure to poor 
living standards and humiliating 
treatment. Overcrowding is so common 
that detainees often have to share beds 
and sleep in shifts, or alternatively they 
sleep on the floor using sleeping bags 
usually provided by NGOs. In some 
detention centers sleeping is only 
possible in a sitting position or in non-
designated sleeping areas such as 
toilets. Other commonly reported 
problems include lack of ventilation, 
limited or non-existent sanitation, 
extreme room temperatures and poor 
hygiene. In addition to the 
aforementioned problems, medical 
provision is minimal due to lack of 
medical staff and medical facilities in the 
detention centers. The vast majority of 
the detainees in Greece are suffering 
from skin diseases, infections and 
depression, which are mostly linked to 
the long duration of the detention under 
these conditions (Médecins Sans 
Frontières 2014).  
The deplorable living conditions of the 
detainees are intensified by the violent 
treatment which they are subjected to by 
detention center staff. Violence in 
Greece’s detention centers varies: from 
racist verbal abuse and destruction of 
religious symbols to forceful body 
searches, direct physical attacks, sexual 
harassment and torture, the detention 
centers’ staff have caused serious mental 
and bodily injuries. In the absence of a 
credible complaints procedure, legal 
representation for detainees, and well-
sourced and independent inspection 
bodies, violence in the detention centers 
is enacted with impunity. After a 
comprehensive review and evaluation of 
reports condemning the living conditions 
in Greece’s detention centers, the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
concluded:  
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All the centres visited by bodies and 
organizations that produced the 
reports…describe a similar situation 
to varying degrees of gravity: 
overcrowding, dirt, lack of ventilation 
little or no possibility of taking a 
walk, no place to relax, insufficient 
mattresses, no free access to toilets, 
inadequate sanitary facilities, no 
privacy, limited access to care. Many 
of the people interviewed also 
complained of insults, particularly 
racist insults, proffered by staff and 
the use of physical violence by 
guards.  
Deplorable living conditions, police 
violence and lack of transparency 
regarding the duration of detention and 
legal representation have led many of 
the detainees to diverse forms of protest 
such as hunger strikes, self-harm, and 
setting mattresses and blankets on fire, 
as well as some attempts to escape. The 
protests of detainees hardly feature in 
national and international media due to 
attempts by the police and immigration 
authorities to cover up or tone down any 
incident of unrest that might highlight 
violations of human rights and the 
overall inadequacy of the Greek state’s 
attempt to deal with the phenomenon of 
immigration and asylum. Frequently 
protestors and hunger strikers are either 
isolated from other detainees or 
transferred to other detention centers 
around Greece, awaiting their 
deportation. The few incidents of unrest 
and protest which have been reported by 
the media involved large-scale police 
operations as well as injuries and arrests. 
On the 10th August 2013, at the 
detention center of Amygdaleza in the 
area of Attiki, detainees started a protest 
over the duration of their detention by 
setting fire to mattresses and by 
attacking their guards. Forty-one 
detainees were charged with violent 
conduct and destruction of public 
property while ten detainees managed to 
escape (To Vima 2013). On the 28th 
August of the same year the NGO United 
Against Racism reported that 400 
detainees at the detention center of 
Orestiada in Northern Greece proceeded 
to a hunger strike over the duration of 
their detention. Many of the strikers were 
in detention for over a year and were 
told that they had to wait for at least 
eighteen months for the assessment of 
their asylum applications (Movement 
Against Racism and Fascist Threat, 2013). 
At the detention center of Komonti, in 
northern Greece, three detainees 
proceeded to hunger strike and the 
sewing shut of their mouths in order to 
draw their guards and immigration 
authorities’ attention to the lack of 
hygiene and functioning facilities in the 
centers (ibid.). Most of these incidents of 
unrest and protests of detainees 
demanding better conditions, 
assessment of asylum applications and 
duration of detention are not covered by 
mainstream media but  become known 
from reports published by NGOs such as 
Greek-Helsinki Monitor, the Human 
Rights Watch, the Greek Council for 
Refugees, and Pro-Asyl.  
The responses of the Greek state to 
pressures for improvement of living 
conditions in the detention centers are 
informed by the financial and 
immigration crisis in Europe as well as 
by the mentality of creating a hostile 
environment for all undocumented 
immigrants aspiring to enter EU 
territories. Greek governments consist-
ently attempt to absolve themselves of 
certain responsibilities by referring to 
three different yet interconnected issues. 
First, the number and actions of 
undocumented immigrants are the 
major contributive factors towards low 
standards of living during detention. 
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Greek authorities point to the high ratio 
of detainees to staff due to the Dublin 
Regulation, which renders the situation 
inside the centers uncontrollable. 
Second, for authorities and detention 
centers’ staff the substandard detention 
conditions are attributable to the 
detainees’ violent protests and their lack 
of respect for their living space. Third, 
immigration authorities are keen to 
remind humanitarian and human rights 
organizations that the recent financial 
crisis in the EU has affected their funding 
and by extension their resources for the 
better treatment of detainees.  
However, several governmental actions 
regarding the apprehension and 
detention of undocumented immigrants 
contradict the reasons provided by the 
same authorities for inadequate 
detention conditions. Due to the 
idiosyncrasies of the Dublin II, Greece 
has been the recipient of substantial EU 
funding for immigration and asylum 
management. In 2012, EU funding was 
made available specifically for the 
development and improvement of 
detention conditions including legal 
representation and screening 
procedures. Yet, the use of these funds 
by the Greek state has been very limited 
and selective. The state continues to 
prioritize the construction of detention 
centers and walls and the militarization 
of the Greek borders, and systematically 
neglects the improvement of living 
conditions inside the detention centers. 
Furthermore, the Greek state’s formal 
commitment to improve detention 
conditions following the guidelines of the 
ECHR, the HRW and the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
have been called into question by these 
same organizations with respect to the 
official rhetoric of immigration services, 
which effectively justifies poor detention 
conditions and violence. In particular, the 
Greek government and immigration 
authorities have contextualized the dire 
detention conditions as part of a wider 
governmental strategy to project the 
image of Greece as an ‘unfriendly 
destination’ for those wishing to enter its 
territory illegally. In direct opposition to 
the aforementioned criticisms, Nikos 
Dendias, the Minister of Public Order and 
Citizen Protection, stated that detention 
centers in Greece function according to 
European standards and explained that 
detention conditions stand at the ‘lowest 
acceptable civilized minimum’ in order 
to deter unregulated immigrants, by 
sending a message that Greece is 
‘unfriendly’ to them (quoted in Cheliotis 
2013).  
The statement of the Minister of Public 
Order and Citizen Protection that Greek 
detention centers operate according to 
the European standards of apprehension 
of unregulated immigration and 
detention indicates the active role of the 
EU in the construction of an immigrant 
crisis and its subsequent management, 
but also its problematic relationship with 
the member-states regarding 
immigration. The EU is critical of 
Greece’s asylum system, immigration 
policies and detention conditions as 
demonstrated by the ECHR 
condemnation, but at the same time it 
criminalizes immigration and militarizes 
the border through the support and 
funding of fences, detention centers and 
the activities of Frontex. On both the 
national and EU levels the legal 
framework around ‘illegal’ immigration 
and its management aims to dissociate 
the EU from any collective responsibility 
with respect to the protection of human 
rights, and at the same time delegates 
responsibility to Greece as a member-
state, regardless of its capacity and will 
to train and inspect guards, and provide 
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legal representation and medical 
facilities.  
 
Conclusion  
Immigration authorities have the 
capacity to delineate the practices and 
mentalities of detention and ultimately 
they can appropriate what exists outside 
the law as part of the state’s 
governmentality. The ideas and rhetoric 
surrounding immigration centers and the 
practices inside them contribute to a 
productive yet restricted understanding 
of who and what needs to be protected 
from the unregulated flows of 
immigrants. Officially built for the 
protection of citizens, social cohesion 
and welfare services, detention centers 
produce collective subjectivities inside 
and outside their confines. In the name 
of security and protection, detention 
centers safeguard the national subject 
from the territorial and social threats 
unregulated immigration is thought to 
pose, and at the same time produce a 
defensive national subject in fear of 
being contaminated by the arrival of 
anonymous, stateless people. Even 
though one of the main functions of the 
detention center is to assign an identity 
to all detainees according to certain 
fixed criteria such as nationality, 
ethnicity, gender, age and education, 
detainees are treated and presented to 
national citizens as a threat to national 
security and cohesion. Detention centers, 
due to their implicitly permanent 
presence, communicate a symbolic 
function with respect to the 
reconceptualization of borders. Such a 
reconceptualization is not limited to the 
political and administrative borders of 
Greece and the EU but extends to the 
very limits of civilization. The 
incorporation of what exists outside the 
law into the law, the violation of human 
rights as a necessary legal practice, and 
the Minister’s admission that detention 
centers need to operate at the ‘lowest 
acceptable civilized minimum’, mean 
that the new conceptualization of 
borders demarcates where European 
civilized practices end (inside the 
European territory), and also where the 
cruelty of the civilized subject personified 
by the immigration authorities is 
permitted. 
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